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Dooley et al (2003, 2004a,b,c) argue that China seeks to raise urban employment by 10-12 million
persons per year, with about 30% of that coming from export growth.  In fact, total employment increased
by 7.5-8  million per year over 1997-2005. We estimate that export growth over 1997-2002 contributed
at most 2.5 million jobs per year, with most of the employment gains coming from non-traded goods
like construction. Exports grew much faster over the 2000-2005 period, which could in principal explain
the entire increase in employment. However, the growth in domestic demand led to three-times more
employment gains than did exports over 2000-2005, while productivity growth subtracted the same
amount again from employment. We conclude that exports have become increasingly important in
stimulating employment in China, but that the same gains could be obtained from growth in domestic









chong@imf.org1.  Introduction 
In a series of four papers, Dooley et al (2003, 2004a,b,c) lay out a vision of a “revived 
Bretton Woods system” to explain international trade and monetary arrangements today. 
According to their vision, this system has the following elements: 
1) Under the old Bretton Woods system, European countries adopted undervalued 
exchange rates and capital controls, allowing then to pursue export-led growth. They eventually 
graduated to flexible exchange rate and capital mobility, thereby jointly forming a “capital 
account” region (along with Canada and Latin America); 
2) Another group of countries including Asia and especially China make up the new 
periphery, again adopted undervalued exchange rates and capital controls to pursue export-led 
growth. These countries form a “trade account” region. China, in particular, needs to employ 
some 200 million persons from the rural area, or 10-12 million persons per year in the urban 
areas, which is facilitated by the inflow of foreign direct investment; 
3) The United States is at the center, and its budget and current account deficits have their 
counterpart in the trade surpluses in Asia. The U.S. current account deficit is financed through 
official inflows from the “trade account” region and private inflows from the “capital account” 
region; 
4) The system is sustainable so long as the “trade account” region continues to finance 
the U.S. trade deficit and protectionism does not occur. Threats of protectionism are offset by the 
profits earned by foreign investors in the “trade account” region, especially China. Conversely, 
the trade deficits run by the U.S. (or equivalently, the Treasury bills held by China) are a form of 
collateral that prevents the Chinese from seizing the assets of foreign firms, which would lead 
U.S. to default on its financial obligations.  
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Some of these various hypotheses are more controversial than others. For example, Wei 
(undated) objects to the idea that U.S. Treasury bills held by China act as collateral against the 
Chinese seizing foreign plants, arguing that: (i) most FDI in China does not come from the U.S., 
but rather from Hong Kong; (ii) there is no recent history of China seizing control of foreign 
firms; (iii) there is even less history of the United States defaulting on its Treasury bill 
obligations. But this final idea of U.S. Treasury bill acting as collateral is not really essential for 
the rest of the theory,
1 and controversy over it need not detract from the other hypotheses. The 
focus of this paper is on the least controversial of their hypotheses, and that is the idea that 
expanding exports from China serve to create employment in the urban areas.  
  Our goal is to quantitatively evaluate this employment hypothesis, i.e. to answer the 
question of how much employment is created by rising Chinese exports. Even this hypothesis is 
not as straightforward as it might seem. A recent article in the Economist entitled “The Jobless 
Boom,” notes that employment growth has been lower than overall economic growth across 
various countries of Asia, especially in China, and that this ratio has been falling over time.
2 
Citing a study by the Asian Development Bank (Felipe and Hasan, 2006a,b), the article suggests 
that the reasons for this weak employment growth has been the shift towards more productive, 
capital-intensive industries. Dooley et al (2004b, p. 4) themselves do not expect the employment 
growth to come entirely from exports, and in fact, suggest that employment growth of 3 million 
workers per year in China will come from rising exports. 
  A logical starting point to determine the employment effect of exports is to look at the 
calculations from input-output (IO) tables for China, with both the direct and indirect demand for 
                                                 
1  In fact, Dooley et al (2004c) motivate the collateral idea by noting that the rest of their theory does not necessarily 
imply a trade deficit in the United States as center country; by adding the trade deficits as collateral, that limitation 
of the theory is overcome. 
2  The Economist, January 14, 2006, pp. 46-47.   
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labor from ordinary and processing exports. As reviewed in section 2, an increase in ordinary 
exports of $1,000 (the annual wage in manufacturing in 2000) leads to employment of 0.44 
person-years in 2000, and 0.34 person-years in 2002, with much smaller effects from processing 
exports. But surprisingly, applying these “static employment coefficients” to compute the 
implied employment gains due to the growth in domestic demand and exports, over 1997–2002 
and 2000–2005, leads to employment gains that vastly exceed the actual employment increase in 
China. In other words, the static employment coefficients are an unreliable guide to computing 
the actual employment effects of export growth. 
  One reason why the static employment effects are unreliable has already been suggested: 
changes in the industry composition of exports towards more productive industries. This source 
of aggregate productivity growth is sometimes called the “Denison effect” in the U.S. literature 
(Nordhaus, 1992, p. 215), as discussed in section 3. Shifting towards more productive industries 
means that the labor needed to produce any given output is reduced. We show in section 4 that 
accounting for the “Denison effect” reduces the employment impact of exports by about 25% 
from the initial calculations, but we still predict employment gains due to rising exports that are 
much too high.   
  Besides the shifting composition of industries, aggregate productivity can rise due to 
technological progress and capital accumulation. We do not attempt to fully account for this 
second source of productivity growth, but make a limited attempt by using the growth in wages 
over time: in our calculations with the IO tables, rising wages means reduced employment 
growth. We show in section 5 that this factor further reduces the employment gains that we can 
expect from exports, to 45% of the initial calculation for ordinary exports and 75% of the initial 
calculation for processing exports. These are rules of thumb that can be used to reduce the static   
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employment coefficients for exports. 
  In section 6 we investigate the growth in domestic demand in China over 1997–2002, 
when our data is most complete. Looking first at traded goods (agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing), and accounting for the “Denison effect,” we find that the net employment 
growth in those sectors due to rising domestic demand is actually negative. That is, the shift 
towards more productive industries has outstripped the increase in final demand, leading to no 
net job creation. The only source of employment gains during 1997–2002 was in the non-traded 
sectors, such as construction, and final consumer services like restaurants, health services, 
education, etc. Taking into account the same factors as for exports, i.e. shifting demand across 
industries and rising wages, we find that the impact of domestic demand on employment is 75% 
smaller than the initial calculation from the IO table, which gives us another rule of thumb. 
  Using these rules of thumb we revise the static employment coefficients, and in section 7 
re-calculate the impact of rising exports and domestic demand on labor demand in China. We 
find the implied employment growth from exports is modest over the 1997–2002 period: not 
more than 2.5 million jobs added per year. During the 2000–2005 period exports grew much 
faster, so the employment impact is also higher: exports added as much as 7.5 million jobs per 
year. However, domestic demand led to three-times more employment gains than did exports, 
while productivity growth subtracted the same amount again from employment. This calculation 
confirms the suggestion in Dooley et al (2004b, note 5) that about 30% of the employment 
growth in China will come from rising exports. We conclude in section 8 that exports have 
become increasingly important in stimulating employment in China, but that the same gains 
could be obtained from growth in domestic demand, especially for tradable goods, which has 
been stagnant until at least 2002, and possibly beyond (Aziz and Cui, 2007).  
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2.  Employment Gains in China 
  We begin by reviewing the recent growth in employment, GDP and exports in China. 
Throughout the paper we focus on the period 1997–2005, which gives us two overlapping five-
year intervals to work with: 1997–2002 and 2000–2005. Despite the relatively short span of 
years and closeness of these two intervals, we will find substantial changes in the Chinese 
economy over this time. 
  In Table 1 we list total employment, broken down by urban and rural, as well as GDP and 
its components during these years. Total employment has grown by 7.5–8 million workers per 
year over this period, while urban employment has grown slightly faster: 8–8.5 million workers, 
as there was some migration out of the countryside. Real GDP and its components, as well as all 
trade data, is measured in constant 2000 US$.
3 Real GDP growth doubled from 5.7% per year 
over 1997–2002 to 11.0% in 2000–2005.
4 Notice that the growth of C+G is much less in the 
2000–2005 period than is the growth in investment, indicating that an increasing share of 
domestic demand is for construction projects and other investments.  
  In Table 2 we provide the data on Chinese ordinary and processing trade, again in 
constant 2000 US$. Both exports and imports grew by more than 20% per year over the 2000–
2005 period, which greatly outstripped their prior growth: the boom in Chinese trade is really a 
feature of the 21
st century. Note that the trade balance listed in the final column of Table 2 does 
not match the values for (X–M) given in the final column of Table 1, because (X–M) includes 
both goods and services as used in GDP accounts, whereas the trade balance in Table 2 is just for  
                                                 
3  We lack specific deflators for components of GDP and trade, and the overall Chinese inflation rate is erratic over 
this period, including some years of deflation. Since our trade data is reported in US$, we decide to use constant 
2000 US$ to measure all other values, converted with the nominal yuan/dollar rate and using the U.S. CPI. 
4  The real GDP figures we are using are deflated by the U.S. CPI, as explained in note 3, and are based on 
expenditure GDP rather than production GDP. For these reasons, the growth rates differ from those sometimes 
reported in the press.  
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merchandise trade.   
  A logical starting point to determine the impacts of export growth on employment are the 
studies by Lau et al (2004), using a 1995 IO table for China, and Lau et al (2006a,b), using a 
2002 IO table. From the 1995 table, Lau et al (2004) estimate that $1,000 of ordinary exports 
from China leads to 0.70 person-years of employment, and $1,000 of processing exports leads to 
0.06 person-years, or roughly one-tenth as much as for ordinary exports. Those estimates are 
shown in Table 3, and have been falling over time. Using the 2002 IO table, Lau et al (2006a,b) 
estimate that $1,000 of ordinary exports from China leads to 0.36 person-years of employment 
(which is one-half as much as they found for 1995), and $1,000 of processing exports leads to 
0.11 person-years (which is twice the estimate for 1995), so processing exports lead to about 
three-tenths the employment of ordinary exports. 
  We will refer to these employment estimates computed from the IO tables as “static 
employment coefficients,” because they each refer to a single year. The change in these static 
employment coefficients  can be due to either of the factors we identified in the introduction: 
shifting composition of exports across industries and technological progress. We will attempt to 
measure the importance of each of these, but first need to replicate the results of Lau and his co-
authors for one year. Using the IO table for 2000, we find that $1,000 of ordinary exports from 
China leads to 0.44 person-years of employment, and $1,000 of processing exports leads to 0.13 
person-years. So again, processing exports leads to about three-tenths the employment of 
ordinary exports. Our estimates for 2000 are also shown in Table 3, and fall neatly in-between 
the estimates of Lau et al (2004, 2006a,b), giving us some confidence that our employment 
estimates are consistent with theirs.  
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  The methodology we have used to obtain the static employment coefficients from the 
2000 IO table is discussed in the Appendix, and is briefly summarized as follows. Denote the 
sources of demand by j = D, O, P for domestic demand, ordinary exports and processing exports, 
respectively. Then the portion of value-added going to labor from $1 demand of type j in sector i 
is 
j
Lit B , which is computed from the IO table as the sum of direct plus indirect payments to 
labor. Our calculations are only for 2000, which we denote t = 0, but the same calculations are 
made by Lau et al (2004, 2006a,b) for 1995 and 2002. Having obtained these coefficients 
j
Lit B 
for each sector, these are averaged across sectors: 


























B ,   for j = O,P      (1) 
where  it D  denotes domestic demand in sector j, while 
O
it X  denotes ordinary exports and 
P
it X 
denotes processing exports. 
  Notice the averaged terms 
j
Lt B  refer to the portion of value-added going to labor. To 
convert this into employment we need to divide by a wage. For the 2000 IO table, we have used 
the average 2000 wage, which was $842 per year. So the static employment coefficients shown 
in Table 3 for 2000 are obtained as: 




0 L ≡ ,  for j =D,O,P        (2) 
We are unsure what wages were used by Lau et al (2004, 2006a,b) for 1995 and 2002, but the 
calculation is presumably analogous to that in (2), which we will write in other years as: 




Lt W / B C ≡ .       ( 2 ' )  
  In Table 3 we also show the static employment coefficient for domestic demand, which 
equals C+I+G. For 2000, we have computed the domestic coefficients as in (1) and (2), for j=D.   
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For 2002, we choose  j
Lt C  so that the implied employment from domestic demand plus exports 
just equals the actual employment in each year. That is, we have chosen  D
Lt C  so that: 










Lt L X C X C D C = + +   ,     (3) 
where Lt is employment in year t. Notice that this full-employment condition also holds in 2000 
by construction of the static employment coefficients from the IO table. 
  Despite the fact that the static employment coefficients are obtained for a single year, 
there is a strong temptation to apply them over time, i.e. to use these coefficients to predict the 
future course of employment due to export growth. There are potentially large errors associated 
with that procedure, however. To see this point theoretically, take the difference of (3) over a 5-
year period. After some simplification, we obtain the equation: 
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+ Δ + + Δ + + Δ = Δ
     (4) 
 
where  5 t t t D D D − − = Δ  is the change over a 5-year interval, and likewise for every other 
variable. On the first line of (4) we have the change in domestic demand and exports times the 
average employment coefficients, and on the second line we have the change in the employment 
coefficients times the average demand. Generally, the employment coefficients are falling over 
time, as can be seen by comparing the rows of Table 3. It follows that the second line of (4) is 
negative, and potentially quite large: the fall in each employment coefficient is multiplied by the 
average level of demand, and not just its growth. Since the second line is negative and potentially 
large, it follows that the first line on the right is potentially much larger than the actual increase 
in employment.  
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  This theoretical result is confirmed in Table 4, where we take the static employment 
coefficients and apply them to the change in exports over the two 5-years periods, 1997-2002 
and 2000-2005. In the first row of Table 4, for example, we use our estimates of the 
j
0 i C 
employment coefficient from the 2000 IO table, as shown in Table 3, and multiply each of the 
employment coefficients by the real change in domestic demand, ordinary exports and  
processing exports over 1997–2002. That is we compute: 
 










0 L t C X C X C D Δ + Δ + Δ = 1 Prediction   ,    (5) 
 
which is similar to the first line of (4).  From domestic demand we predict an employment 
increase of 216 million persons,
5 and for ordinary processing exports we predict an employment 
increase of 31 million persons. Summing over these we obtain nearly 250 million workers, as 
compared to an actual employment increase of only 39 million! We see that simply multiplying 
the real changes in demand and exports by the employment coefficients, as in (5), massively 
overstates the true change in employment.  
  The situation is even worse over the 2000–2005 period, where now we use the static 
employment coefficients of Lau et al (2006a) from the 2002 IO table. Again we multiply the 
employment coefficients by the real change in domestic demand and exports, as in (5), and 
predict an increase in employment in China of 550 million workers, as compared to the actual 
increase of only 37 million! Thus, the predicted employment impact vastly exceeds the actual 
employment increase. The difference between the predicted and actual employment increases is 
due to fall in the employment coefficients, as shown on the second line of (4).  
                                                 
5  The rise in domestic demand of $411.5 billion in Table 4 is taken from the IO tables for 1997 and 2002, and 
exceeds the rise in domestic demand of $345.4, taken from C+I+G in the national accounts, Table 1. We use 
domestic demand from the IO tables for consistency with later calculations. If instead we use the national accounts 
figure to predict employment gains in Table 4, then we obtain 225 million workers over 1997–2002, which is 
somewhat less than what we report in Table 4.  
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  We conclude from these calculations that the static employment coefficients, times the 
changes in demand, do not provide reliable estimates of the actual employment gains in China. 
Reasons for this have already been suggested: the static employment coefficients do not take into 
account the changing industry composition of domestic demand and exports, and the coefficients 
can also fall due to technological progress and capital accumulation. We now examine each of 
these explanations in turn. 
 
3.  Shifting Composition of Exports and Domestic Demand 
  The static employment coefficients computed from the IO table refer to the employment 
impact of an additional $1,000 in average exports or domestic demand, i.e. using the same 
composition of output that occurred in the year of the IO table, as shown by taking the averages 
in (1). But that is not a good guide for the effects of an actual change in demand, because with 
shifting comparative advantage, export growth may be in industries different from in the past. In 
addition, for domestic demand the growth in China in recent years has been especially strong in 
investment (as shown in Table 1), especially construction, which differs in its labor requirements 
from other industries. 
  The growth in exports is shown in Figures 1 and 2, where we graph the percentage 
increase over 2000-2005 in total and ordinary exports, respectively, and industry wages in 2000. 
Regardless of whether we use total or ordinary exports, the industry with the greatest percentage 
increase in exports was electronic and telecommunications equipment, and that industry also had 
the highest wage in 2000.
6 Overall, there is a positive correlation between the percentage growth 
in exports, and the real wage in 2000, with food products and tobacco appearing as an outlier 
(and a relatively small export industry). The fact that the percentage increase in exports differs 
                                                 
6   This industry also had by far the greatest increase in real exports over 2000-2005, exceeding $160 billion, though 
the majority of those sales were for processing exports.  
 
11
substantially across industries, meaning that the use of “average” exports as in Lau et al (2004, 
2006a,b) will lead to inaccurate results. Instead, we want to use the “marginal” exports, i.e. the 
actual increase in exports that occurred in each industry over the five-year period. 
  In theoretical terms, we want to compare the results of using aggregate employment 
coefficients, as shown in Table 3, with using disaggregate sector-level coefficients. To obtain the  
disaggregate results, write the full-employment condition (1) alternatively as: 
 











Lit i L X C X C D C   ,     (6) 
 
where  D
Lit C,   O
Lit C , and  P
Lit C  are the disaggregate employment coefficients by IO sectors, and 
likewise for domestic demand Dit, ordinary exports  O
it X  and processing exports  P
it X . Taking the 
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By using the sectoral data in the 2000 IO table, we can make an alternative prediction of the  
employment gains from the first line of (7): 
 











0 Li it ∑ Δ + Δ + Δ = 2 Prediction       (8) 
 
where we are using employment coefficients from the year 2000 table in place of the average 
employment coefficients that appear in (5). Note that these are obtained from the 2000 IO table 
by dividing 
j
0 Li B  by the wage in each sector: 




0 Li W / B C ≡ ,   for j = D,O,P.      (9)  
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  Comparing the new prediction obtained from the disaggregate coefficients in (8) with that  
from the aggregate coefficients in (5), since  ∑ Δ = Δ




t X X we obtain: 
 

















0 Li it ∑ − Δ + − Δ + − Δ
= − 1 Prediction 2 Prediction
    (10) 
 
If there is a negative correlation between the growth in demand and the employment coefficients 
in each sector, as we would expect if growth in output occurs in the more efficient sectors, then 
(10) is negative and our second prediction of employment growth is less than the first. This 
reduction in employment gains come from shifts towards more productive industries, and is an 
example of what Nordhaus (1992, p. 215) calls the “Denison effect.” Nordhaus refers to the work 
of Edward Denison (1967, 1980), who demonstrated that if resources shift from low-productivity 
to high-productivity industries, like from agriculture to manufacturing, then the economy would 
show aggregate productivity growth even if sectoral productivity growth was zero in both 
sectors. The aggregate productivity growth is due to a “reallocation effect” across industries. The 
flip-side of this aggregate productivity growth is that the labor needed to produce any given 
output is reduced, as we are showing in (10). 

































~ ,   for j = O,P.    (11) 
Notice that (11) is an average of the sectoral employment coefficients 
j
0 Li C  in 2000, but using 
the change in domestic demand and exports as weights, rather than their average levels as in (1) -
(2). Again, since  ∑ Δ = Δ




t X X , it is immediate that prediction 2 in (8) can 
be alternatively written as:  
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0 L t Δ + Δ + Δ = 2 Prediction       (12) 
 
which is the change in demand times the revised employment coefficients. From (11) and (12), 
we can see our second prediction of the rise in employment uses actual or “marginal” increase in 
exports and domestic demand, rather than the “averages” used in (1)-(2) and (5). 
  In the following sections, we implement this second prediction, as well as a third variant, 
using the 2000 IO table. In sections 4 and 5 we focus on the growth of exports, over 1997–2002 
and 2000–2005, and in section 6 discuss the growth in domestic demand, in which case we do 
not have disaggregate data for 2005 so we are restricted to investigating 1997–2002. 
 
4.  Growth of Exports, 1997–2002 and 2000–2005 
  In Table 5, we report the employment gains over 1997-2002 and 2000-2005 using the 
disaggregate increase in exports over these two periods (prediction 2a). In the former period, 
1997-2002, the employment growth is 23 million persons, rather than 31 million from Table 1. 
So the shift towards more productive industries reduces the employment growth by 25% (or 17% 
for ordinary exports and 52% for processing exports). A similar decline is seen over 2000-2005, 
when using the actual rather than the average, increase in exports reduces employment growth 
from 115 million (prediction 1) to 86 million (prediction 2a), again a decline of 25%.
7 We 
conclude that the employment gain from increased exports is reduced once we account for the 
industry composition of exports, as suggested by Felipe and Hasan (2006a,b).  
  The adjustments we have made for prediction 2 can be extended in two directions: we 
have the data to take into account the provincial compositions of exports, along with provincial 
                                                 
7  If instead of using the industry wages in prediction 2, as in (9), we instead continued to use the overall average 
wage of $842 in 2000, then the predicted employment impact of exports is reduced by 15% as compared with the 
first prediction. That reduction comes from using the disaggregate calculation as in (8), but with the average wage of 
$842 in (9). The additional 10% reduction for prediction 2 is obtained by using the industry wages, as in (9).  
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wages by industry; or to account for the differing wages paid by types of firm-ownership (state-
owned, collective, or private) and the exports by firm-ownership and industry as well as wages 
by firm-ownership and industry. To the extent that exports are shifting to more productive 
provinces (e.g. coastal) or firms (e.g. private), the estimated employment gains are reduced. 
  It should be noted that the maintained assumption in these calculations is that the national 
IO table for 2000 applies equally well across provinces and across types of firm-ownership. We 
have only very limited data that could be used to test this assumption. To the extent possible, we 
applied the methods of Bernstein and Weinstein (2002), and found that the 2000 IO table appears 
to hold reasonably well across provinces except for Guangdong (where labor compensation was 
higher than predicted from the national IO table). Because Guangdong was the only outlier, and 
because our ability to construct an alternative IO table for Guangdong is extremely limited, we 
continued to apply the national table across all provinces, and types of firm-ownership. 
  Focusing first on the provincial effects (prediction 2b), accounting for the shift in exports 
by industry and province further reduces the employment impact of increased exports, to 20.6 
million persons over 1997-2002, or one-third less than the initial calculation. For 2000-2005, the 
implied increase in employment is 77.5 million persons, which is also one-third less than the 
initial calculation. The employment effects that are obtained when we instead take into account 
the shift in exports by industry and firm-ownership (prediction 2c) are similar to those that take 
into account provincial effects: the predicted employment gains are reduced by about one-third 
from the initial calculations. The data we have available do not allow us to take into account both 
of these effects at the same time. In any case, for 2000-2005 the implied increase in employment 




5.  Increase in Wages due to Productivity Gains 
  A final limitation of the static employment coefficients computed from the IO table, and 
also a limitation of our results reported in Table 5, is that we have assumed that wages are 
constant over time. That is, we are using wages in 2000: either at the overall wage in (2), or the 
industry wage in (9). But of course, real wages will rise over time due to both productivity gains 
and capital accumulation. With rising wages, any implied increase in value-added and payments 
to labor will correspond to a smaller increase in employment. 
  For our next calculation, we divide the direct plus indirect payments to labor from the 
2000 IO table by the real 1997 and 2002 wages, respectively, when estimate labor demand in 
each year. That is, we obtain the employment coefficients in each year as: 








5 Lit W / B C ˆ
− − ≡ , for j = D,O,P.     (13)   
Then our third prediction of the employment gains for rising demand is: 
 



















5 Lit 5 it
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  Note that if instead of the estimates in (13), we had used the true employment coefficients 
j
Lit C  obtained from the IO table in each year, then (14) would be an exact prediction of the 
change in employment: there would be no error involved. So the difference between the third 
prediction, which uses the industry wages in each year, and the actual changes in employment 
occurs because: (i) we are using wages in (13) that do not differ between domestic and export 
production, and (ii) we are still using coefficients 
j
0 Li B  from 2000, rather than allowing these 
coefficients to change over time. In brief, we still do not accurately predict employment changes 
with (14) because we are not allowing the IO table to change over time, and our wage data is not  
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detailed enough. Still, we find that this third prediction is a further improvement over our earlier 
calculations. 
  In Table 6 we show how the implied employment effects are further reduced when we 
allow for the actual increase in wages over 1997–2002 or 2000–2005. For 1997–2002, we find 
that the employment gains due to ordinary exports range from 5 to 10 million (predictions 3a, 3b 
and 3c), which are reduced by 55% or more as compared to the initial calculation. For processing 
exports, the implied employment effects range from -1.4 to 1.7 million, a reduction of at least 
80% from the initial calculation. Over this period, most of the increase in exports over these 
years can be explained by the shift in workers towards more efficient industries, firms and 
provinces, so the employment gain is very modest. Over 2000–2005, we also find that the 
employment gains due to increased ordinary exports are reduced by 55% from our initial 
calculation, while the employment gains due to processing exports are reduced by about 75%.  
  To sum up, our calculations have reduced the employment impact of increased exports by 
more than one-half of the initial calculation for ordinary exports, and at least three-quarters for 
processing exports. Are these results in Table 6 believable? The smaller employment gains 
indicate an efficient reallocation of resources, which is plausible. We note that these efficiency 
gains come from reallocations across many industries (as well as province and firm-ownership), 
and do not simply reflect a rural-urban migration. Indeed, agriculture and manufacturing 
industries tend to rise or fall together in our calculations: allowing for rising wages over time, we 
find that the increase in exports is associated with rising employment in both agriculture and the 
sum of all manufacturing industries. So the net changes in implied employment reported in 
Tables 5 and 6 would be similar if we omitted agriculture and reported instead the changes in 
manufacturing employment due to exports.  
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6. Shifting Composition of Domestic Demand, 1997–2002  
  To measure domestic demand we rely on the sum of C+I+G by industry from the IO 
tables, which we have for the years 1997, 2000 and 2002, but not for 2005.
8 So to evaluate the 
change in employment due to domestic demand, we are restricted to the five-year period 1997-
2002, and will not be able to report any results for 2000-2005. Furthermore, domestic demand is 
not broken down by province nor by the type of firm-ownership. So the calculations for domestic 
demand will only be broken down by industry over 1997-2002. 
  The implied employment increase due to the growth in domestic demand are reported in 
Table 7, where we distinguish domestic demand for tradable goods (all manufacturing plus 
mining and agriculture) and non-traded goods (all utilities and services, including construction).
9 
That is, we have re-computed the employment coefficients shown in (1)-(2) and (10)-(11) for 
domestic demand by separating trade from non-traded goods. Traded goods are shown in part A 
of Table 7. We find that domestic demand for tradable goods has risen by a very modest amount 
in real terms over 1997-2002, $24 billion, shown in the first column. Multiplying that increase in 
demand by the static employment coefficient of 0.525, we obtain a modest rise in employment of 
12.7 million persons, as shown in the third column (prediction 1).  
  However, if instead we use the actual change in demand rather than its “average” change, 
then fall in demand would actually lead to reduced employment of 10 million workers when 
holding wages fixed at their 2000 levels (prediction 2). Allowing for the growth of wages 
between 1997 and 2002, the implied fall in employment is even higher, 50 million workers, due 
to the fall in domestic demand  (prediction 3). Only a very small amount, 3.3 million workers, is 
made up by the increase in demand due to rising exports, so the net change in employment due to  
                                                 
8  Imports are treated entirely as intermediate inputs in the IO table, so need not be deducted from C+I+G. 
9  Tradable goods are defined as sectors 1-22 of the 2000 IO table, and nontradable goods as sectors 23-40.  
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domestic demand plus exports is a fall of some 47 million jobs. 
  Since employment actually increased by 39 million jobs over 1997-2002, the gap must be 
made up by the non-traded sector, which is confirmed in the next row of Table 7. An initial 
calculation using a static employment coefficient gives a rise in employment of 203 million 
(prediction 1, part B). Use the actual change in demand rather than its “average” change, then the  
employment increase becomes 166 million workers when holding wages fixed at their 2000 
levels (prediction 2). Allowing wages to rise over 1997-2002, the employment gain in non-
tradable goods is 111 million workers (prediction 3). That is an enormous rise in employment 
due to domestic demand, which far exceeds any of our calculations for exports. The sector with 
the largest increase in domestic demand is construction, which accounts for at least half of the 
overall rise in employment. Employment gains are also shown in final consumer services like 
real estate, restaurants, health services, education, etc. 
  The changes in domestic demand for tradable and non-tradable goods are graphed in 
Figure 3, along with the industry wages in 2000.
10 Sectors with the greatest increase in demand 
include a few tradable industries, like instruments and office machinery, and electronic and 
telecommunication equipment, but many more non-traded goods: real estate, restaurants, 
scientific research, education, public administration, health and social services, etc. At the far 
right of the figure, sectors like textile, wearing apparel, food products, furniture and agriculture 
all have negative growth in real demand over 1997–2002.  We find it quite remarkable that the 
rapidly growing Chinese economy did not generate more domestic demand for its own tradable 
goods over this period! Domestic demand should be treated as a viable alternative to exports as a 
source of employment growth, but did not function in that way, presumably because the income 
gains in China did not lead to a commensurate rise in consumption. Aziz and Cui (2007) argue  
                                                 
10  For convenience we omit the petroleum and mining sectors in Figure 3, as well as several other smaller sectors.  
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that one reason for this outcome is that household income did not rise by as much as GDP.  
  That estimate for rising employment due to non-traded goods can be combined with the 
fall in employment in tradable goods, to obtain a total implied change in employment of 111–50 
= 61 million workers (prediction 3, part C). That is our final estimate for 1997-2002. In principle, 
this estimate of 61 million jobs added over 1997-2002, from both domestic demand and exports, 
should equal the actual gain in employment of 39 million jobs. The discrepancy between these 
numbers (25 million) can be due to multiple causes: we have not been able to distinguish 
domestic demand by firm-ownership or province; we have used a fixed 2000 IO table; and the 
wage data we use is not as detailed as we would like. But we feel that even if these improvement 
were made to our calculations, the overall message of Table 7 would not change: the vast 
majority of job growth over 1997-2002 is due to the increase in demand for non-traded goods, 
especially the construction sector. The main reason that employment has grown as much as it has 
in China over 1997-2002 is due to the increase in domestic demand for non-tradable goods!  
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that our final estimate of 61 million job gained 
over 1997–2002, from prediction 3, is vastly better than our initial calculation of 216 million 
jobs (prediction 1, part C). Comparing these two numbers, we see that the initial calculation is 
reduced by 72% due to the adjustments we have made. That is nearly the same adjustment (75%) 
that we found in the previous section for processing trade, but larger than the adjustment (45%) 
that we found for ordinary exports. It is noteworthy that a downwards adjustment of 45% is 
shown in Table 7 for the nontradable sector, where the employment gains were reduced from 203 
million in our initial calculation to 61 million (prediction 3). The fact that total employment 
generated from domestic demand is revised downwards by nearly 75% reflects the very weak 
growth in demand for tradable goods, leading to negative employment gains once we account for  
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the industry composition of demand and wage increases over time. In other words, the “Denison 
effect” operates very strongly in the pattern of domestic demand for tradable goods, as we have 
already seen for exports.
11 
 
7.  Implied Growth in Employment Once Again 
  Let us now summarize what we have learned from the last three sections, and return to 
the calculations of employment growth. In Table 8 we show again the static employment 
coefficients for 2000 (our calculations) and 2002 (from Lau et al, 2006a,b). We found in section 
2 that those coefficients vastly overstate the actual change in employment over 1997–2002 or 
2000–2005. But by using improved calculations, we were able to reduce the predicted 
employment growth. Our final calculations showed that the employment growth for ordinary 
exports was 55% lower than obtained from the static employment coefficients, while that 
employment growth from processing exports and domestic demand were 75% lower (and 
possibly more). We apply those rules of thumb to the initial static employment coefficients to 
obtain revised employment coefficients, as shown in Table 8.  
  For example, instead of the initial calculations for the 2000 IO table, we now predict that 
$1000 in ordinary exports generates 0.44×0.45 = 0.20 person-years of employment, while $1000 
in processing exports or domestic demand generates 0.13×0.25 = 0.03 and 0.53×0.25 = 0.13 
person-years, respectively. For 2002, we now predict that $1000 in ordinary exports generates 
0.36×0.45 = 0.16 person-years of employment, while $1000 processing exports of domestic 
demand generates 0.11×0.25 = 0.03 and 0.44×0.25 = 0.11 person-years, respectively. These 
                                                 
11  Note that in Figure 3, the industry with tradable-good industry with the highest percentage increase in domestic 
demand is instruments and office machinery, followed by electronic and telecommunication equipment. The latter 
industry has among the highest wage of any tradable industry, and also shows the highest percentage increase in 
exports (both for ordinary and processing exports).  
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estimates are upper-bounds, since we obtained lower employment impacts in some calculations, 
but we shall use these adjustments as conservative. 
  We use the revised employment coefficients in Table 8 to re-calculate the employment 
gains for both periods, as shown in Table 9. For 1997–2002, we find that the growth in domestic 
demand (for nontradable goods, in particular), leads to an increase in employment of 67 million 
workers. In addition, the growth in exports (for ordinary exports, especially), leads to an increase 
in employment of 12 million workers, or about 2.5 million workers per year. Summing over 
domestic demand and exports, we predict employment gains of 79 million from 1997–2002, as 
compared to the actual employment increase of 39 million.
12 So our prediction is still twice as 
big as the actual gain, but that is a great improvement over our initial calculation (Table 4) where 
the predicted employment gain was 216 million – more than five times greater than the actual 
increase! The gap between our revised employment gain over 1997–2002 and the actual is due to 
the fall in the labor coefficients 
j
Lit B  from the IO table, reflecting technological progress and 
capital accumulation. 
  In later period, 2000–2005, the growth in domestic demand and exports are both stronger. 
We again use the revised employment coefficient from Table 8 for 2002, and multiply those by 
the real changes in domestic demand and exports. We find that the growth in domestic demand 
(especially investment), leads to an increase in employment of 114 million workers. In addition, 
the growth in exports adds employment of another 38 million workers. By coincidence, the 
predicted employment impact of exports is nearly exactly equal to the actual rise in employment 
of 37 million workers, or 7.5 million per year.  
                                                 
12   Note that the predicted employment gains in Table 9 are not exactly the same as the final row of Table 7, 
because in Table 9 we are using the rules of thumb shown in Table 8 to reduce the static employment coefficients, 
i.e. the coefficient for ordinary exports is reduced by 55%, and the coefficients for processing exports and domestic 
demand are reduced by 75%. Those rules of thumb are broadly consistent but not identical to the calculations in the 
final row of Table 7.  
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  However, the role of domestic demand over 2000–2005, which added 114 million to 
employment is actually three-times large than the role of exports. Based on that evidence, we 
could not refute the claim that domestic demand is responsible for the employment increase. 
Whether we want to claim that it is domestic demand or exports that are responsible is really just 
an exercise in semantics, however: the fact is that both have played an important role in 
stimulating employment growth, and the sum of them (152 million) is still considerably larger 
than the actual employment gains (37.4 million) over this period. Again, we would attribute the 
gap between the predicted and actual employment gains as due to technological progress and 
capital accumulation, as well as illustrating the limits of how far we can push our calculations 
from the IO table. We have made a substantial improvement over the initial calculations, whose 
predictions were off by an order of magnitude, but still have not obtained a precise accounting of 
the causes of employment growth. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 Dooley  et al (2003, 2004a,b,c) argue that the current systems of current account 
imbalances is sustainable so long as China is willing to absorb the Treasury bills used to finance 
the U.S. deficits. And that willingness is tied to its desire to move workers from unproductive 
rural employment into urban, manufacturing jobs. These authors suggest that China needs to re-
employ some 200 million persons from the countryside, or 10-12 million persons per year in the 
urban areas, and that growth in exports will explain about 30% if these employment gains. 
  We have evaluated this hypothesis by using calculations on the employment impact of 
exports, and domestic demand, from Chinese IO tables. We have started with the calculations of 
Lau et al (2004, 2006a,b) for 1995 and 2002, and added our own calculation for the 2000 IO 
table. The “static employment coefficients” obtained from these tables summarize the amount of  
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employment generated by $1000 in exports or domestic demand for one year. By construction, 
these static employment coefficients are consistent with the full-employment condition for the 
economy. But the static employment coefficients do a very poor job at predicting the future 
growth in employment from the future growth in exports or domestic demand. We have shown 
that the errors involved in this forward-looking forecast are enormous, which means that the 
static employment coefficients are highly unreliable for that purpose. 
  To improve on that situation, we have proposed adjustments to the static employment 
coefficients. These adjustments take into account the future growth in export and domestic 
industries, which may be quite different from their former growth, as well as rising wages over 
time. The adjustments partially close the gap between predicted and actual employment growth, 
even when using an IO table for a single year. Using the revised employment coefficients, we 
find that export growth over 1997-2002 explains at most one-third of the total employment 
growth in the economy (2.5 out of 7.5–8  million workers per year). For 2000–2005, however, 
export growth was faster, and in principle can explain the entire employment growth of 7.5 
million workers per year. However, the rise in domestic demand – especially for investment – 
generated employment gains that are three-times larger than those for exports, which confirms 
the relative importance of exports as compared to domestic demand suggested by Dooley et al 
(2004b). The same amount of employment is reduced by productivity growth in the economy, so 
the net gain is back to 7.5 million workers per year, somewhat less than the goal put forth by 
Dooley et al (2003, 2004a,b,c). 
  The other key finding is that over 1997–2002, the rise in domestic demand was nearly 
entirely in the nontradable sector: predicted employment for tradable goods actually fell. This is 
very surprising, but reflects the shift in expenditure in China towards construction projects as  
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well as nontradable consumer goods. We do not have the detailed data to evaluate whether the 
same shift occurred during 2000–2005, but from the aggregate GDP data, there has been 
substantially faster growth in investment I instead of private and public consumption C+G. So 
we speculate that domestic demand for tradable goods continues to lag, despite the newspaper 
reports of rising consumer expenditures; this view is also put forth by Aziz and Cui (2007), who 
point to the slow growth in household income as an explanation. 
  The importance of this finding is that China could certainly turn towards domestic 
demand instead of export (and consumer expenditures, in particular) as an engine to stimulate 
employment. The transition from export-led growth to domestic demand would undoubtedly rely 
on many economic and policy actions that are now only beginning: a real appreciation as the 
prices of non-tradable goods begin to rise, shifting domestic demand towards both imports and 
exportable goods; accompanied by some nominal appreciation of the yuan; fiscal policies that 
allow for greater security of income in old age, allowing higher expenditures today; reform of the 
banking sector; etc. Readers are referred to Aziz (2006), Aziz and Dunaway (2007), and 
Anderson (2007) for further policy discussions. We believe that it is these features – and not the 
reliance on export-led growth – that should determine the future path of the government and 
trade accounts in China and ultimately restore greater balance to these accounts.  
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Appendix: Chinese Input-Output Table 
Figure A1: Input-Output Table: Direct Input Requirement Coefficient Matrix 
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The structure of China’s extended IO table separates domestic input from ordinary and 
processing imported inputs. The direct input requirement coefficient matrix is presented in 
Figure A1, where: 
 
• 
DD A , 
DO A ,
DP A  are the matrixes of direct input requirement of domestic products for one 
unit of domestic product, ordinary export, and processing export, respectively.  
• 
MD A and 
OO A  are the direct input requirement coefficient of ordinary import for one unit 
domestic production and ordinary exports;  
• 




V A , 
O
V A , and 
P
V A  are each an  n × 1 vector of  direct value added caused by one dollar of 
sector j ’s production in domestic products, ordinary export, or processing exports; 
• 
D
L A , 
O
L A , 
P
L A  are correspondingly the direct labor demand generated by one dollar 
production of domestic products, ordinary export, or processing exports. 
• 
O E  and 
P E  are each an  1 × n  vector of ordinary export and processing export respectively.  
 
 
Total Value Added (VA) Coefficient Matrix 
 
To calculate the total economy value added, we must consider the linkages between 
sectors. When one unit domestic product is produced, it generates a first round of value added, 
which is the direct value added 
D
V A . However, in order to produce this unit of domestic product,  
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intermediate inputs must be used. The production of these intermediate inputs hence create the 
second round of value added, which is named indirect value added (
DD D
V A A ⋅ ). This process of 
creating indirect value added can continue on and on, as intermediate inputs are needed to 
produce other intermediate inputs. Therefore, the total domestic VA induced by a unit domestic 
production is the sum of first round direct domestic VA and all the indirect domestic VA. Hence, 
we derive the total domestic VA coefficient (
D
V B ) aroused by domestic production as:  
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  Similarly, producing one unit of ordinary or processing export products also requires 
domestic made intermediate goods, which in turn generates many rounds of VA from these 
domestic intermediate inputs. We thus have:  
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V B  represents the total VA coefficient vector for production i, for i= D (domestic), O 
(ordinary), and P(processing) respectively.  
 
For the same reason, total import content caused by Domestic Production and exports are: 
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This is conceptually similar to the vertical specialization (VS) as in Hummels, Ishii and 
Yi (2001) and Dean, Fung and Wang (2007).  
 
Total Value Added obtained from Chen et. al 2002 Trade Extended IO Table 
  
  Using an extended IO table from Chen et al (2004), we estimate the total value-added B 
matrixes using equations (1) - (6). The results are reported in Table A1. 
 
Table A1: Total Value-Added 
 
IO Industries  BVD  BVO  BVP  BMD  BMO  BMP 
1.Agriculture  0.969 0.896 0.625 0.031 0.104 0.375 
2.Coal mining and processing  0.945  0.811  0  0.055  0.189  0 
3.Crude petroleum and natural gas 
products  0.957 0.814 0.762 0.043 0.186 0.238 
4.Metal  ore  mining  0.908 0.623 0.370 0.092 0.377 0.630 
5.Non-ferrous  mineral  mining  0.944 0.772 0.443 0.056 0.228 0.557 
6.Manufacture of food products and 
tobacco  processing  0.965 0.909 0.474 0.035 0.091 0.526 
7.Textile  goods  0.956 0.899 0.256 0.044 0.101 0.744 
8.Wearing apparel, leather, furs, down 
and  related  products  0.958 0.909 0.171 0.042 0.091 0.829 
9.Sawmills  and  furniture  0.915 0.674 0.225 0.085 0.326 0.775 
10.Paper and products, printing and 
record  medium  reproduction  0.928 0.760 0.335 0.072 0.240 0.665 
11.Petroleum  processing  and  coking  0.865 0.268 0.343 0.135 0.732 0.657 
12.Chemicals  0.923 0.664 0.345 0.077 0.336 0.655 
13.Nonmetal  mineral  products  0.926 0.737 0.352 0.074 0.263 0.648 
14.Metals smelting and pressing  0.901  0.635  0.404  0.099  0.365  0.596 
15.Metal  products  0.901 0.655 0.404 0.099 0.345 0.596 
16.Machinery  and  equipment  0.890 0.591 0.347 0.110 0.409 0.653 
17.Transport  equipment  0.895 0.647 0.311 0.105 0.353 0.689 
18.Electric equipment and machinery  0.899  0.680  0.174  0.101  0.320  0.826 
19.Electronic and telecommunication 
equipment  0.855 0.702 0.184 0.145 0.298 0.816 
20.Instruments, meters, cultural and 
office machinery  0.857 0.550 0.191 0.143 0.450 0.809 
21.Maintenance and repair of 
machinery and equipment  0.907  0  0  0.093  0  0 
22.Other  manufacturing    products  0.929 0.767 0.385 0.071 0.233 0.615 
23.Scrap  and  waste  1 0 0 0 0 0 
24.Electricity, steam and hot water 
production and supply  0.930  0  0  0.070  0  0 
25.Gas production and supply  0.921  0  0  0.079  0  0  
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26.Water production and supply  0.954  0  0  0.046  0  0 
27.Construction  0.916 0.723 0  0.084 0.277 0 
28.Transport  and  warehousing  0.944 0.806 0.717 0.056 0.194 0.283 
29.Post  and  telecommunication  0.941 0.850 0.388 0.059 0.150 0.612 
30.Wholesale  and  retail  trade  0.949 0.835 0.672 0.051 0.165 0.328 
31.Eating and drinking places  0.967 0.921 0.274 0.033 0.079 0.726 
32.Passenger  transport  0.928 0.766 0.633 0.072 0.234 0.367 
33.Finance  and  insurance  0.974 0.907 0.875 0.026 0.093 0.125 
34.Real  estate  0.968 0  0  0.032 0  0 
35.Social  services  0.929 0.769 0.579 0.071 0.231 0.421 
36.Health services, sports and social 
welfare  0.927 0.741 0  0.073 0.259 0 
37.Education, culture and arts, radio, 
film and television  0.957 0.871 0.755 0.043 0.129 0.245 
38.Scientific  research  0.893 0  0  0.107 0  0 
39.General  technical  services  0.951 0.824 0.622 0.049 0.176 0.378 
40.Public administration and other 




  In Table A2 we show the allocation of value-added to labor and capital, along with the 
share of value-added within the sum of value-added plus imports used for each type of 
production: domestic production, ordinary exports, and processing exports. For each type of 
production, about one-half of value-added goes towards compensating labor, with the remainder 
divided between capital income (one-third) and taxes on production (one-sixth). The amount of 
value-added differs a great deal across type of production, however: it is 94% of the sum of 
value-added plus imports used in domestic production, 62% for ordinary exports, and 20% for 
processing exports. 
  We have also confirmed that the employment levels in Table 1 are consistent with the IO 
table itself, as described in Table A3. In the first column we list the economy-wide compensation 
to labor from the various years of the IO tables, and in the next columns the real agricultural and 
manufacturing wages (in US$, 2000). China employs one-half of its workers in agriculture and 
one-half in manufacturing, so we take the simple average of these two wages to obtain the  
 
29
average wage, which is $842 in 2000, for example. Dividing the labor compensation from the IO 
table by the average wage, we obtain employment of 716.5 million persons in 2000, which is 
very close to the 720.5 million persons reported in Table 1. 
  For years before and after 2000, however, there is an inconsistency between the actual 
employment figures reported by the China Statistical Yearbook, in the last column of Table 4, 
and the implied employment obtained by dividing total compensation from the IO tables by 
average wages from the China Statistical Yearbook, in the second-last column. Implied 
employment even falls over 1997–2002, which does not seem believable. The problem appears 
to be an inconsistency between the wage series we use (from the China Statistical Yearbook) and 
the wages that are implicit in the IO tables, at least in 1997 and 2002.
13 It is essential that the 
implied employment from the IO table in each year equal actual employment in the economy. To 
achieve this, we inflate the 1997 wages from the China Statistical Yearbook by 8%, and deflate 
the 2002 wages by 4%, obtaining the revised wages reported in the bottom of Table 4. Those 
adjusted wages lead to implied employment from the IO tables that is roughly equal to that 
reported by the China Statistical Yearbook. We will continue to use this simple adjustment to 
1997 and 2002 wages in all our calculations. 
                                                 
13  For 2000, when we have the most complete IO table available, it lists both labor compensation and employment 
at the end of the year. So the wages being used in the Io table can be computed, and they are highly consistent with 
both the wages and actual employment figures used in Table 4 for 2000. For 1997 and 2002, however, the IO table 




Division of Value-added, 2000 and 2002 
 











Value-added/(Value-added + imports)  0.94 0.62  0.20 0.36  n.a. 
Compensation of employees/VA  0.54 0.50  0.45 0.54 0.48 
Net taxes on production/Value-added  0.14 0.16  0.18 0.15 0.14 
Gross Capital Income/Value-added  0.31 0.34  0.37 0.31 0.37 
 
Notes:  
Figures reported here are only for the direct use of labor and imports in each type of production, and do not take into 




Table A3: Wages and Employment 
Year  Compensation 














  (Million 











1995  334,000 476.6 699.4  520  641.9  680.7 
1997  501,101 557.9 767.8  618  811.0  698.2 
2000  603,003 626.2 1057.0  842  716.5  720.9 
2002  712,224 740.0 1272.4  1,006  708.0  737.4 
2005 n.a.  894.1 1695.5  1,468    758.3 
Using revised wage data:
4      
1997  501,101 602.5 829.2  715.9  700.0  698.2 
2002  712,224 710.4 1221.5  966.0  737.3  737.4 
 
Notes:  
1. Average wage is the simple average of manufacturing and agriculture sectors. Source for wage data is the China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2006. 
2. Implied employment = real compensation from IO table / real average wage.  
3. Actual employment data come from China Statistical Yearbook of each year.  
4. The revised wage data multiplies 1997 wages by 1.08, and multiplies 2002 wages by 0.96 , so that the implied 
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China’s Employment and GDP 
 
Year  Employment  Urban      Rural      GDP  C+G  Investment   X - M   
  (Millions of persons)  (billions of US$, 2000) 
1997  698 208 490  1,057  623 388  46 
2000  721 232 489  1,193  743 421  29 
2002  737 248 490  1,392  829 527  36 
2005  758 273 485  2,009  1,043  856 110 
  Growth Rate (million per year)  Growth Rate (percent per year, compound) 
1997-2002  7.8 8.0  -0.2  5.7 5.9 6.3 -4.9 
2000-2005  7.5 8.4  -0.9  11.0  7.0  15.3  30.7 
           
 
Source: 























1997  89 107 196 77  75  152  44 
2000  112 138 249 133  93  225  24 
2002  139 172 312 166 117  283  29 
2005  305 367 672 340 242  582  90 
  Growth Rate (percent per year, compound) 
1997-2002  9.3 10.0 9.7 16.5 9.2  13.1 -7.9 
2000-2005  22.2 21.7 21.9 20.8 21.2  20.9  30.1 
            
 
Source: 





Static Employment Coefficients 
 
       Source  Implied Employment Increase per $1,000 





































1. Lau et. al (2004, Tables 7, 8).  
2. Our estimates for 2000 IO table, as described in the Appendix. 
3. Lau et. al (2006a, Table 4) for ordinary and processing exports, with domestic demand coefficient computed as 




Implied Chinese Employment from Domestic Demand and Exports  
(Using static employment coefficients)  
 
       Source  Period  Growth in demand    
(billion US$, 2000)  
Implied Employment 
Increase





















































1.  Uses the static employment coefficients from Table 3, and multiplies these by the real growth in domestic 
demand, ordinary exports and processing exports. 




 Table 5: 
Implied Increase in Chinese Employment from Exports 
 (Using IO table in 2000, and industry wages in 2000)  
 
   Period 
 
Implied Employment Increase     
(Million persons) 
Percentage Reduction 
from Prediction 1 
Our estimates using 











1997-2002  22.3 8.5  30.7      Prediction 1, from Table 4 
Using average exports,  
and average wages in 2000 
2000-2005  85.7 29.7 115.4     
1997-2002  18.6 4.1  22.7 17% 52%  Prediction 2a 
Using industry exports,  
and industry wages in 2000 
2000-2005  69.4 16.7  86.1 19%  44% 
1997-2002  17.0 3.5  20.6 24% 59%  Prediction 2b, 
Using industry-province exports, 
and industry-province wages in 2000 
2000-2005  63.2 14.4  77.5 26%  52% 
1997-2002  17.2 3.9  21.0 23% 54%  Prediction 2c 
Using firm-ownership exports,  
and firm-ownership wages in 2000 
2000-2005  59.1 15.1  74.1 31%  49% 
 




Implied Chinese Employment from Exports 
(Using IO table in 2000, and industry wages by year)  
 
   Period 
 
Implied Employment Increase     
(Million persons) 
Percentage Reduction 
from Prediction 1 
Estimates using 











1997-2002  17.2 3.9  21.0 23% 54%  Prediction 2a, Table 5 
Using firm-ownership exports, and  
firm-ownership wages in 2000 
2000-2005  59.1 15.1  74.1 31%  49% 
1997-2002  4.7 -1.4  3.3 79%  117%  Prediction 3a 
Using industry exports, and 
industry wages by year 
2000-2005  37.9 7.8  45.7 56% 74% 
1997-2002  5.7 0.1  5.8 74%  99%  Prediction 3b, 
Using industry-province exports, 
and ind.-province wages by year 
2000-2005  36.5 7.8  44.4 57% 74% 
1997-2002  10.3 1.7  12.0 54% 80%  Prediction 3c 
Using firm-ownership exports, and  
firm-ownership wages by year 
2000-2005  38.3 8.1  46.4 55% 73% 
 





Implied Chinese Employment from Domestic Demand and Exports, 1997–2002  




Growth in Demand 
(billion US$, 2000) 
Implied Employment 
Increase (Million persons) 
 
Percentage Reduction 
from Prediction 1 
Our estimates using 













     A.  Traded Goods    
Prediction 1, 
Using average demand,  









    
Prediction 2 
Using industry demand, 














Using industry demand, 













     B.  Non-traded Goods    
Prediction 1 
Using average demand,  














Using industry demand, 














Using industry demand, 













     C.  All Goods    
Prediction 1 
Using average demand,  













Using industry demand, 














Using industry demand, 



















Revised Employment Coefficients 
 
       Source  Implied Employment Increase per $1,000 














































1. From Table 3. 
2. Revised as explained in the text and shown in the table. 
3. Lau et. al (2006a, Table 4), from Table 3. 




Implied Chinese Employment from Domestic Demand and Exports 
(Using revised employment coefficients)  
 
       Source  Period  Growth in demand    
(billion US$, 2000)  
Implied Employment 
Increase






















































1.  Uses the revised employment coefficients from Table 8, and multiplies these by the real growth in domestic 
demand, ordinary exports and processing exports. 
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